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The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #06442-84/1  
15 November 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM:

Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

A Warning and Forecast meeting on Sub-Saharan Africa was held on 13 November 1984. The attached report has not been coordinated with meeting participants but is being circulated to them. If they believe their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you.

Attachment:  
NIC #06442-84

This memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED  
when separated from Attachment.

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## WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

SUDAN

Unanimous concern was expressed that Sudan faces an economic crunch in the next two-three months that could seriously threaten the Nimeiri regime. While Nimeiri has weathered such crises in the past, there was widespread agreement that the upcoming crunch is of significantly greater magnitude than those in the past. It was noted that Sudan is hopelessly in arrears to the IMF, oil stocks are near depletion, food demonstrations already have occurred in the outskirts of Khartoum, and that the low level of the Nile will produce serious power shortages.

On the political front, the CIA analyst noted some short-term optimism based largely on the moderating of the Islamization campaign. There remains considerable uncertainty and speculation about the seriousness of the recent "Nuba coup plot," including whether or not there was any Libyan or Ethiopian involvement. [REDACTED]

It is still impossible to state with confidence whether southern dissidents are likely to launch a dry season offensive. The current military situation appears stalemated. Reconciliation talks between Nimeiri and some southern dissidents apparently are going on but no definitive progress has been discerned or is likely soon.

Warning Note: Nimeiri may be able to tough out the coming economic crunch, but he will be politically vulnerable during the next two-three months. Special note is made that Nimeiri is scheduled to be traveling outside Sudan during a good part of December.

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FAMINE


Without minimizing the human toll of the current famine conditions or the importance of relief logistics, it was noted that the Community needs to focus on the political implications of the drought/food crisis. Current conditions must be addressed with respect to (1) their ability to trigger political instability, and (2) their relationship to overall patterns of economic decline. Several questions were raised that require our attention during the next year:

- Are some regimes more susceptible than others to political instability as a consequence of drought/famine?
- What indicators signal political trouble ahead? Is there a threshold beyond which political instability becomes more likely? What groups (urban, military, etc.) do we need to keep particularly close watch on?
- Do current conditions make some regimes more vulnerable to outside meddling?

MOZAMBIQUE

In an overview of recent events, the INR analyst noted the obstinacy of both RENAMO and the Machel government in the wake of the breakdown of talks. On the one hand, the issue appears to increasingly threaten the cohesiveness and stability of the Machel government. On the other, South Africa appears to be reaching the limit of its influence with RENAMO. There was some debate on the possibility that South African Defense Forces were egging RENAMO on, and on the overall status of the Nkomati accords. General agreement, however, was expressed that P. W. Botha and Pik Botha's foreign ministry for the present were committed to reaching an agreement, and that Portugal now finds itself in the unenviable position of being criticized by all sides.

Warning Note: There is considerable concern about the unity of the Machel government given their continued inability to bring RENAMO to heel. Machel faces a difficult political task keeping his faction on top and preventing growing divisiveness from undermining the regime's stability.



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CHAD

There was considerable discussion of the significance of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Libyan military equipment still in northern Chad after the withdrawal deadline. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] CIA noted that the forces are not well balanced militarily and appear to be postured defensively. CIA posited three scenarios about why the equipment is still there, strongly cautioning that the situation is extremely ambiguous at present:

- Qadhafi could be keeping the equipment there to better train and equip the rebels and as a bargaining chip to get more out of the French than simply withdrawal;
- the Libyans may not have had time to pull out completely, and may now have moved it back after hiding it from the observer force; or
- this could presage a longer term commitment or strategy, although it was viewed unlikely that Qadhafi was poised to make a quick dash south.

The NSC representative also suggested that Qadhafi could hope that maintaining a presence in the north will add to pressure on the French to push Habre to the negotiating table.

Warning Note: Qadhafi's intentions remain unclear but suspect. It is still too early to assess the significance of the Libyan presence. Qadhafi will be under considerable pressure to respond, however, should Habre set out to retake the north. We also are on watch for signs of stepped up support for southern dissidents, especially in light of the recent raid in the Central African Republic.

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ANGOLA

The CIA analyst noted that Savimbi recently held a media extravaganza in Angola and that UNITA's central committee has outlined at least part of its future course. UNITA has stated its intention to send 7,000

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troops--a figure generally thought to be too high--to increase activity in the northwest in general and in the Luanda area in particular. UNITA also approved setting up alternative supply lines which could signal increased activity to come on the Zaire/Angola border. [REDACTED]

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